I. Introduction
While numerous definitions of corporate social responsibility (hereafter CSR) exist, most contain the notion that CSR requires that firms recognize that they have greater obligations to society than simply maximizing profits within the limits of the law. Consistent with this view, Benabou and Tirole (2010, 2) note that "A standard definition of CSR is that it is about sacrificing profits in the social interest. For there to be sacrifice, the firm must go beyond its legal and contractual obligations, on a voluntary basis." 1 Because most business decisions have some impact on society, almost every business decision can be evaluated in terms of CSR. For example, all businesses use energy and therefore could consider projects that reduce energy consumption or use renewable energy to reduce carbon emissions (Porter and Kramer 2006) . As another example, businesses who depend on suppliers could decide whether and how closely to evaluate the business practices of companies in their supply chain (Roberts 2003; Maloni and Brown 2006) .
Despite the importance of CSR decisions, much is still unknown about how companies make decisions involving CSR initiatives. A common assumption is that upper-level managers make such decisions after carefully evaluating the costs and benefits of alternative courses of action (Sprinkle and Maines 2010) .
2 However, this assumption may be too simplistic because it fails to capture an important aspect of actual CSR decision environments: Where do upper-level managers get the information needed to make CSR decisions? As with most business decisions, upper-level managers likely acquire the necessary information to make CSR decisions from 1 See Carroll (1999) for a more extensive discussion of the different ways CSR has been defined in academic research. 2 Sprinkle and Maines (2010) relate CSR decisions to other business decisions such as the purchase of materials, product promotion and pricing, explaining that "decisions related to corporate responsibility also can be viewed through the lens of benefits reaped by, and costs incurred by, the company" and that "effective CSR decisions rely on assessments of value and opportunity costs."
lower-level managers who produce and report such information to the upper-level managers. My study examines the role that such reporting plays in CSR decisions.
Considering whether and how the need for reporting by lower-level managers affects CSR decisions is important because this introduces the possibility that lower-level managers'
reports could be biased in favor of CSR projects. 3 Lower-level managers may bias their reports if they have preferences for CSR because they value the societal benefits associated with CSR projects.
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Assuming that lower-level managers value the societal benefits associated with CSR projects, there are two separate aspects of the reporting environment that could influence the extent to which they bias their reports in favor of CSR projects. First, because making a report that is biased in favor of a CSR project requires dishonest reporting, honesty preferences could act as a natural control against biased reports. Second, reporting settings with information asymmetry between lower-level and upper-level managers often allow lower-level managers to build slack into their reports. As explained later, the ability to consume slack could either increase or decrease lower-level managers' willingness to bias their reports in favor of CSR projects.
To isolate the effect of honesty preferences and the ability to consume slack on the extent of bias in lower-level managers' reports, I conduct an experiment with three conditions (No Reporting, Reporting-w/o Slack, and Reporting-w Slack). In my No Reporting condition, 3 I define a lower-level manager's report as being biased in favor of a CSR project if it causes a less profitable CSR project to be implemented rather than a more profitable non-CSR project. This definition reflects the fact that, if the upper-level manager does not share the lower-level manager's preference for the CSR project, the upper-level manager would consider such a report to be biased in favor of the CSR project. 4 In the remainder of the paper for expositional expediency I refer to a "preference for CSR" when describing lower-level managers who value the societal benefits associated with CSR activities. Lower-level managers who exhibit a preference for CSR can be thought of as demonstrating other-regarding preferences in that they are not acting to maximize their own personal wealth. Prior research has shown that individuals exhibit other-regarding preferences in numerous settings. Other-regarding preferences have been shown in public goods settings (Ledyard 1995) , in dictator and ultimatum games as well as gift exchange settings (Cooper and Kagel 2009). participants assume the role of a lower-level manager who observes the actual costs of both a CSR and a non-CSR project and then recommends which project to implement. The recommended project is then automatically implemented. 5 In my Reporting-w/o Slack condition, participants also assume the role of a lower-level manager who observes the same actual costs of the same CSR and non-CSR projects. However, in this condition lower-level managers must report the costs of each project. The project with the lowest reported cost is then automatically implemented. In both the No Reporting and the Reporting-w/o Slack conditions, lower-level managers' payoffs are based on the actual cost of the project that is implemented.
Therefore, the only difference between these two conditions is that there is a reporting requirement in the Reporting-w/o Slack condition but not in the No Reporting condition.
Because honesty preferences can only come into play when lower-level managers must make a report, I can isolate the effect of honesty preferences on the frequency with which the less profitable CSR project is implemented (i.e., the bias in favor of CSR projects) by comparing the frequency of such projects in the No Reporting condition to that in the Reporting-w/o Slack condition.
In my Reporting-w Slack condition, as in my Reporting-w/o Slack condition, the lowerlevel manager must report the costs of both the CSR and the non-CSR projects, with the lowest reported cost project being automatically implemented. However, in contrast to my Reportingw/o Slack condition in which lower-level managers' payoffs are based on the actual cost of the 5 Rather than using real upper-level managers in my study who make an implementation decision based on the information communicated to them by the lower-level manager, I use an implementation rule that maximizes firm profit based on the lower-level managers' recommendation or report. Using actual upper-level managers could have increased the frequency with which less profitable CSR projects were implemented because actual upperlevel managers might have implemented the CSR project even when it was less profitable if they have a personal preference for projects that benefit society. However, the focus of my study is the potential impact of lower-level managers' biased recommendations or reports on the frequency of less profitable CSR project implementation and not on the frequency of less profitable CSR project implementation as a result of the upper-level managers' preferences for CSR projects. Therefore, I did not use actual upper-level manager participants in my study. My study expands our knowledge of CSR because it is the first to examine the impact of internal reporting on the information used to make CSR decisions. Specifically, my results indicate that lower-level managers bias their reports in favor of CSR projects, and that this bias is likely to persist in reporting environments in which lower-level managers are able to build slack 6 Although My Reporting-w/o Slack condition is used primarily to isolate the effect of the ability to consume slack on biased reporting in favor of CSR projects, this condition reflects a possible real world setting. For example, if a company has a strong control system in place, the actual cost of a prospective project could be discovered after the project has been implemented, which would prevent the lower-level managers from building slack into their reports.
into their reports. Thus, even if upper-level managers intend to make CSR decisions that maximize firm profit, the need to acquire inputs for CSR decisions from lower-level managers can lead to the implementation of less profitable CSR projects. Because of the possible effect of biased reporting on firm profit, both upper-level managers and shareholders should be interested in my findings. In addition, although my results show that lower-level managers' biased reports negatively impact firm profit, as explained in more detail later, evidence from my Reporting-w Slack condition suggests that firms can actually be more profitable when lower-level managers have a strong preference for CSR than when they have a strong preference for wealth.
II. Development of Hypothesis and Research Questions Background
Prior CSR research has primarily focused on the relationship between CSR and firm financial performance, with largely inconclusive results. The most recent meta-analysis of the relationship between CSR and firm financial performance (Margolis et al. 2009 ) examined 251 studies that were conducted over the past 40 years and concluded that while there appears to be a positive association between CSR and firm financial performance, it is quite small and is even smaller for studies conducted in the past10 years.
More recent CSR accounting research has focused on external reporting related to CSR. Dhaliwal et al. (2011 and are two recent archival studies that show that companies that issue a stand-alone CSR report are associated with a lower cost of equity and lower analyst forecast error, respectively. Elliott et al. (2012) and Martin and Moser (2012) recommendation or cost reports. However, by using an implementation rule based on the financial incentives of the lower level managers to implement the more profitable project, I can focus on the lower-level managers' recommendation or reporting choice, which is the primary focus of my study.
Development of Hypothesis and Research Questions
Lower-level managers maximize their personal payoff and firm profit by ensuring that the lower cost project is implemented, whether that is the CSR or the non-CSR project.
Therefore, in order to examine whether a reporting requirement influences CSR decisions, it must first be established that some lower-level managers knowingly bias their recommendations or reports in favor of less profitable CSR projects even when this lowers their personal wealth and firm profit.
Many individuals contribute some of their personal wealth to charitable causes. Some economic models explain such behavior by assuming that individuals gain utility in the form of a "warm-glow" from donating to public charities (Andreoni 1988; Andreoni 1990 ). More recent neuro-economic studies have supported this assumption by finding heightened levels of neural activity in the reward areas of the brain when an individual chooses to make a charitable donation (Harbaugh et al. 2007 ). Thus, it is likely that some managers cause less profitable CSR projects to be implemented because of the warm glow they receive from doing so.
Although personal contributions to charitable causes share similarities with managers who pursue CSR activities at a personal cost, there is an important difference. When individuals choose to donate to charity, they do so knowing that their decision affects only themselves and society. In contrast, when managers take actions that result in less profitable CSR activities, they know that they are also affecting other shareholders who may not want the manager to take this action. Because of the strong focus on maximizing shareholder value in corporate settings, CSR decisions made in corporate settings may differ from decisions made by individuals in charitable giving settings that have no such focus. However, recent experimental evidence suggests that even in a corporate setting, a significant portion of individuals will sacrifice personal and other shareholder wealth to invest in less profitable CSR activities (Martin and Moser 2012) . Based on this prior evidence, my first hypothesis is:
H1: A significant portion of lower-level managers will bias their recommendation in the No Reporting setting to implement the less profitable CSR project even though this reduces their personal wealth and firm profit.
Assuming that, consistent with H1, a significant portion of lower-level managers make biased recommendations in favor of less profitable CSR projects in a setting with no reporting requirement, my next question is whether requiring lower-level managers to make a factual assertion in their report affects the extent of any such bias. The need to make a factual assertion in a reporting setting has been shown to influence reporting choices (Rankin et. al 2008) .
Specifically, prior research demonstrates that some individuals are deterred from misreporting by a preference for honesty (Evans et al. 2001; Stevens 2002; Hannan et al. 2006; Hobson et al. 2011 ).
Because in my setting the project with the lower reported cost is always implemented, lower-level reporting managers who want the higher cost CSR project to be implemented will need to misreport the CSR project as having the lower cost. 8 In turn, because lower-level managers must misreport to get the CSR project implemented in my setting, lower-level managers' preferences for honesty could reduce or eliminate any bias that managers may otherwise have in favor of the CSR project.
Although prior research shows that honesty preferences can act as a significant control against misreporting, there are several reasons why the role of honesty preferences in reducing the frequency of less profitable CSR projects in my setting is not so clear. First, there is an important distinction between the role of honesty preferences in prior budgeting settings and my setting. In the prior budgeting studies showing that honesty preferences can significantly reduce self-interested wealth-maximizing behavior (Evans et al. 2001; Stevens 2002; Hobson et al. 2011 ), the sole motive for misreporting was to increase the misreporting manager's personal payoff. In contrast, misreporting to implement a less profitable CSR project in my study decreases the misreporting manager's personal payoff, while simultaneously benefiting society.
Managers most likely can more easily justify misreporting (at a personal cost) to benefit society than to justify misreporting that is solely for their own personal gain. Consistent with this reasoning, Church et al. (2012) find that managers' misreporting increases when it does not solely benefit the manager, but also benefits a third party. Similarly, misreporting in my setting benefits others and thus honesty preferences may have less of a deterrent effect on misreporting.
Second, prior research has shown that, when examined separately, honesty preferences can be a significant factor in motivating behavior (Evans et al. 2001; Rankin et al. 2008; Hobson et al. 2011) . However, in my setting, the affect of reporting on lower-level managers' bias in favor of the CSR project does not depend only on the reporting manager's preference for honesty. Rather, it depends on the relative strength of the reporting manager's preference for honesty versus his or her preference for CSR.
There are several possible outcomes when reporting managers have preferences for both honesty and CSR. If the preference for honesty dominates, the preference for honesty will act as a complete control against the implementation of less profitable CSR projects. Alternatively, if the preference for CSR dominates, the preference for honesty will have no deterrent effect on the implementation of less profitable CSR projects. Finally, the preference for honesty could dominate the preference for CSR for some managers, while the preference for CSR could dominate the preference for honesty for other managers. In this case, the preference for honesty would act as a partial control against the implementation of less profitable CSR projects.
Because I am unable to make a clear directional prediction regarding the effect of honesty preferences on the implementation of less profitable CSR projects, I investigate the following research question:
RQ1: In a reporting setting that requires a factual assertion will honesty preferences act as a complete, partial, or no control against the implementation of less profitable CSR projects?
If information asymmetry regarding the costs of the two projects persists after one of the projects has been implemented, this not only allows a lower-level manager to misreport which project has the lower cost, it also allows the lower-level manager to build slack into his or her report by misreporting the cost of the project that will be implemented to be higher than it actually is. 9 Prior research that examined reporting settings in which managers can build slack into their reports (Young 1985; Evans et al. 2001; Stevens 2002; Hannan et al. 2006; Rankin et al. 2008; Brown et al. 2009; Hobson et al. 2011 ) finds that most individuals in a reporting setting with slack will misreport to consume some, but not all, of the slack available. Although it is unclear which, if either, of the two potential effects described above will occur, evidence from prior budgeting studies offers some insights. As explained above, lowerlevel managers would need to plan to consume very high amounts of slack for the ability to consume slack to decrease the frequency of less profitable CSR projects. We know from prior budgeting experiments that few individuals take all of the available slack and that most take only a portion (Evans et al. 2001) . Therefore, it is unlikely that the ability to consume slack would increase the cost of implementing a less profitable CSR project for most lower-level managers, and thus also unlikely that the ability to consume slack would result in a decrease in the frequency of less profitable CSR projects in the Reporting-w Slack condition versus the Reporting-w/o Slack condition.
If most lower-level managers only consume a portion of available slack, it becomes more likely that they would reduce or eliminate the personal cost of reporting to implement a less profitable CSR project by increasing the amount of slack they take. Recent work in the area of moral reasoning suggests that individuals who do something "good" or are reminded of something good about themselves feel more license to engage in subsequent unethical acts (Zhong et al. 2009; Mazar and Zhong 2009; Sacdeva et al. 2009 ). Thus, when a lower-level manager implements the CSR project in my study, s/he could feel good about doing so, and this could help to offset any guilt s/he has about taking more slack to offset the personal cost of implementing the less profitable CSR project.
However, there is an important difference between the prior moral reasoning studies and my study. The "good" act in my study is less clearly a "good" act than those used in prior moral reasoning studies because it also includes elements that can be viewed as unethical. That is, even a manager who reports to implement a less profitable CSR project is engaging in pro-social behavior at one level (the "good" act), this requires misreporting and reduces company profits (which both could be viewed as unethical). This makes it less likely that lower-level managers in my study who bias their reports in favor of the less profitable CSR project will engage in moral reasoning to justify taking more slack.
Finally, there is another way in which the ability to consume slack could influence the frequency of less profitable CSR project implementation. The Reporting-w Slack condition provides strong financial incentives for lower-level managers to misreport to consume slack.
Prior research shows that many individuals are influenced by financial incentives to misreport to consume at least some of the available slack (Evans et al. 2001) , and thus the effectiveness of honesty preferences to act as a deterrent against misreporting for a different purpose may be reduced. Specifically, because the ability to consume slack leads to misreporting for one purpose (to consume slack for financial gain), honesty preferences may be less effective in preventing misreporting for another purpose (to implement the less profitable CSR project) because the report can no longer be 100% honest. In other words, the ability to consume slack may increase misreporting to implement a less profitable CSR project because reports that consume slack are already dishonest.
Because the possible effects outlined above do not clearly predict how the ability to consume slack will influence the frequency of less profitable CSR project implementation, my second research question is as follows: RQ2: Will lower-level managers' ability to consume slack in a reporting setting influence the frequency of less profitable CSR project implementation compared to a reporting setting in which lower-level managers cannot consume slack?
In the Reporting-w Slack condition, there are three possible preferences that could guide the lower-level manager's reporting behavior: a preference for wealth, a preference for honesty and a preference for CSR. Those whose actions are dominated by wealth (hereafter, "wealth types") would never misreport to implement a less profitable CSR project, but would misreport to consume a large amount of slack. Those whose actions are dominated by a preference for honesty (hereafter, "honest types") would also never misreport to implement a less profitable CSR project but, unlike the wealth types, would not misreport to consume slack. Those whose actions are dominated by a preference for CSR (hereafter, "CSR types") would misreport to implement a less profitable CSR project, but it is unclear what amount of slack, if any, such individuals would take. CSR types could misreport only to get the CSR project implemented, but not to consume any slack, which would make their slack consumption similar to that of the honest types. Alternatively, CSR types could misreport to consume the maximum amount of slack remaining after misreporting to get the CSR option implemented, which would make their slack consumption similar to that of the wealth types. Finally, CSR types could misreport to consume some, but not all, of the available slack, which would make their slack consumption greater than that of the honest types, but less than that of the wealth types. Thus, my third research question is:
RQ3: What percentage of slack will lower-level managers whose reporting choices are dominated by a preference for CSR take relative to lower-level managers whose actions are dominated by either preferences for honesty or preferences for wealth?
Whether the lower-level manager's report causes a less profitable CSR project to be implemented and how much slack is consumed by the lower-level manager both affect firm profit. Firm profit is highest when the lower-level manager's reporting behavior is dominated by a preference for honesty. This is because honest types will never report to implement the less profitable CSR project or to consume slack. Firm profit is lowest when the lower-level managers' reporting behavior is dominated by a preference for wealth. This is because even though such managers would not report to implement the less profitable CSR project, they would consume as much slack as possible. By definition, lower-level managers whose actions are dominated by a preference for CSR generate less firm profit than lower-level managers whose actions are dominated by a preference for honesty because firm profit decreases when the less profitable CSR option is implemented. However, it is unclear whether lower-level managers whose actions are dominated by a preference for CSR will generate more firm profit than lower-level managers whose actions are dominated by a preference for wealth. This is because, as discussed in the development of 
Participants
Participants were recruited from MBA and upper-class undergraduate business classes at the University of Pittsburgh. There were 108 participants in total, with 36 participants in each experimental condition. 12 Several experimental sessions were conducted for each experimental condition, with each experimental session consisting of 24 periods. 13 At the conclusion of each experimental session, one of the 24 periods was selected at random to be the payment period, and all participants were paid their participation fee and the payoff that they earned for the payment period.
No Reporting Condition Procedures
Participants in the No Reporting condition assumed the role of a lower-level manager in a company whose task was to recommend one of two separate and competing projects to their upper-level manager for implementation (only one of the projects could be implemented). The As indicated above, the lower-level managers' recommendation determined whether the CSR project or the non-CSR project was implemented. Lower-level managers knew that if their recommendation resulted in the CSR project being implemented, this had a real societal benefit because it resulted in a donation of real dollars to the Carbonfund. The Carbonfund is a real nonprofit environmental organization that uses contributions to invest in renewable energy and reforestation projects that reduce the amount of greenhouse gases in the environment. To reflect inferences except for one case in which including this variable strengthened the statistical significance from marginal to less than p=.05, all results reported in the paper are for tests that exclude this variable. 13 Because of the availability of participants, the data for the No Reporting condition were collected in four experimental sessions, the data for the Reporting-w/o Slack condition were collected in two experimental sessions, and the data for the Reporting-w Slack condition were collected in three experimental sessions.
the fact that the CSR project had real societal benefits, the lower-level managers were aware that each time their recommendation resulted in the CSR project being implemented, 50% of the actual cost of the CSR project was contributed to this real "green" fund. 14 Specifically, at the conclusion of the experiment, I made a donation of real dollars equal to 50% of the actual cost of any CSR project implemented in the randomly selected payment period to the Carbonfund. Eight different actual cost pairs were used in the experiment. As shown in Table 1 , the lower cost project in each cost pair always had a cost of $10, while the higher cost project in each cost pair was one of the following costs: $11, $13, $15 or $20. Each of the eight specific cost pairs was provided three times (8 cost pairs x 3 = 24 total periods). The order in which the cost pairs were presented to the participants was randomly chosen prior to the experimental sessions, with this randomly chosen pattern used in all experimental sessions in all conditions. (Table 1) The actual cost pairs provided to the participants followed a balanced design in which the CSR project had a lower cost in four of the cost pairs, and the non-CSR project had a lower cost in the remaining four cost pairs. This balanced design allowed me to ensure that lower-level managers who recommended or reported to implement a less profitable CSR project were not making mistakes by comparing the frequency of less profitable CSR project implementation to the frequency of less profitable non-CSR project implementation.
The lower-level managers' payoff in the No Reporting condition consisted of a bonus equal to 45% of the firm's pre-bonus profit from the project as shown below:
Lower-level manager's payoff = 45% x ($40 project cash flows -the actual cost amount of implemented project)
Using this payoff calculation, we can see that lower-level managers maximize their payoff by always recommending the project with the lowest actual cost (see Panel A of Table 2 ).
( Table 2) Firm profit in the No Reporting condition was equal to the cash flows from the implemented project less the actual cost of the implemented project and less the cost of the bonus paid as shown below:
The firm's profit= $40 project cash flows -the actual cost amount of the implemented projectbonus paid Using this firm profit calculation, we can see that firm profit is highest when the lower-level manager recommends the project with the lowest actual cost.
Reporting-w/o Slack Condition Procedures
The 
Reporting-w Slack Condition Procedures
The specific steps for the Reporting- This allows lower-level managers to build slack into their reports because the lower-level manager can report a cost that is higher than the actual cost for the project that will be implemented. Thus, the lower-level managers' payoff in the Reporting-w Slack condition includes two components 1) a bonus equal to 45% of the firm's pre-bonus profit from the project, and 2) the difference between the reported and the actual cost of the project that is implemented as shown below:
Lower-level manager's payoff = 45% x ($40 project cash flows -the reported cost amount of implemented project) + (Reported cost of the implemented project -actual cost of the implemented project)
Using this payoff calculation, we can see that the range of personal payoffs for the lower-level manager is always higher when their report causes the project with the lowest actual cost to be implemented (see Panel B of Table 2 ).
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The firm's profit from the implemented project is equal to the cash flows from the project less the reported cost for the implemented project and less the cost of the bonus paid as shown below:
The firm's profit= $40 project cash flows -the reported cost amount of the implemented project -bonus paid From this firm profit calculation, we can see that range of possible firm profits is higher when the lower-level manager's report causes the project with the lowest actual cost to be implemented. Except for the lower-level manager's ability to consume slack and the related effect on the lower-level manager's payoff and firm profit described above, all other procedures and parameters described earlier for the Reporting-w/o Slack condition are the same for the Reporting-w Slack condition.
Additional Payoff Procedures -All Conditions
Before each experimental session began, participants were informed that at the conclusion of the experimental session, one period would be selected at random to be the payment period, and all participants except for one would be paid based on the payoff that they earned in their role as a lower-level manager for that period. However, to ensure that the participants felt that the impact of their actions on the firm's profit was real, they were also informed prior to the experimental session that one participant would be randomly chosen to be paid the average firm profit for the randomly selected payment period rather than the payoff they earned as a lower-level manager. To ensure that participants' considerations of the firm's profit was as similar to the real world as possible, the firm profit associated with the randomly selected participant was excluded from the calculation of the average firm profit that was paid to the randomly selected participant. This ensured that, as in the real world, lower-level managers'
knew that their reporting choices would have a real impact on the firm's profit, but they would not be impacting their own personal payoff through their impact on the firm's profit.
IV. Results

Tests of H1
H1 predicts that a significant portion of lower-level managers will recommend the less profitable CSR project in the No Reporting condition. 16 As shown in Panel A of Table 3, ( Table 3) A limitation of using the confidence interval reported above to test H1 is that, because lower-level managers can only err in one direction, any mistakes are misclassified as evidence 16 A CSR project is less profitable in this particular setting if it has the higher actual costs of the two projects. For this reason, the terms "less profitable", "higher cost" and "more costly" are used interchangeably.
supporting H1. To overcome this limitation, I compare how often lower-level managers recommended the less profitable CSR project to how often they recommended the less profitable non-CSR project. As shown in Figure 2 and Panel A of However, as explained in the analysis for H1, establishing that the confidence interval for the frequency of less profitable CSR projects does not include zero does not account for the fact that some lower-level managers making reports to implement a less profitable CSR project may simply be making mistakes. Therefore, I again control for the possibility of mistakes by comparing how often participants report to implement a less profitable CSR project to how often participants report to implement a less profitable non-CSR project. As shown in Figure 2 and Panel B of Table 3 , lower-level managers reported to implement a less profitable non-CSR project only 4.9% of the time (16 out of 324 opportunities). This proportion is significantly smaller (z=14.35, p<.001) than the proportion of lower-level managers who misreported to implement a less profitable CSR project (22.2%). This result provides evidence that in most cases in which lower-level managers misreported to implement a less profitable CSR project, they did so because they had a preference for the CSR project, and not because they made a mistake. Finally, this documented behavior is not driven by a select few participants. Eighteen of the 36 participants (50%) chose to misreport to implement a less profitable CSR project at least once, with 5 of those participants (13.9%) choosing to do so more than 50% of the time (not tabulated).
Since a significant portion of managers implement a less profitable CSR project in my
Reporting-w/o Slack condition, it is clear that a reporting requirement does not act as a complete control for the implementation of less profitable CSR projects. However, the honesty preferences introduced when there is a reporting requirement could still act as a partial control on the implementation of less profitable CSR projects.
I tested this possibility using a logistic regression with whether a less profitable CSR negatively correlated with how often a participant misreported to implement the less profitable CSR project, supporting the conclusion that individuals' preferences for honesty reduced their willingness to misreport to implement the less profitable CSR project.
Tests of RQ2
As discussed earlier, the presence of information asymmetry between lower-level and upper-level managers regarding project costs not only allows the lower-level manager to misreport which project has the lower cost, it could also allow lower-level managers to misreport to consume slack. RQ2 asks if this ability to consume slack affects the frequency of less profitable CSR project implementation.
To test RQ2, I compare the frequency of less profitable CSR project implementation in the Reporting-w Slack condition to the frequency in the Reporting-w/o Slack condition. As shown in Figure 2 and Panel C of Table 3 , the rate of less profitable CSR implementation in the Reporting-w Slack condition was 36.1%. In contrast, recall that the rate of less profitable CSR project implementation was only 22.2% in the Reporting-w/o Slack condition. The frequency of less profitable CSR project implementation in the Reporting-w Slack condition (36.1%) is significantly higher (z=-5.21, p<.001) than in the Reporting-w/o Slack condition (22.2%),
suggesting that the ability to consume slack increased the frequency of less profitable CSR project implementation.
However, the simple comparison of frequencies reported above does not control for the fact that participants in both conditions made multiple choices. Therefore, I also compared the frequencies across these two conditions using a logistic regression that controls for repeated measures. The dichotomous dependent variable is whether the less profitable CSR project was implemented (yes or no), and the dichotomous independent variable is the experimental condition (Reporting-w Slack or Reporting-w/o Slack). The results provide marginal support (z=-1.82, p=.069) for the conclusion that the frequency of less profitable CSR project implementation is higher in the Reporting-w Slack condition than the Reporting-w/o Slack condition. Overall, my results suggest that the ability to consume slack increases the willingness of lower-level managers to misreport to implement a less profitable CSR project.
As described earlier in the development of RQ2, the ability to consume slack could have either increased or decreased the willingness of lower-level managers to report to implement the less profitable CSR project. The results above indicate that the ability to consume slack increased the frequency of less profitable CSR project implementation. A possible reason for this finding is that the ability to consume slack allowed lower-level managers to offset the personal cost of misreporting to implement the less profitable CSR project by consuming slack.
If this is case, lower-level managers' payoffs should be higher in the Reporting-w Slack condition than in the Reporting-w/o Slack condition.
I tested this using a regression with the lower-level manager's payoff when they misreported to implement the less profitable CSR project as the dependent variable and condition
(1 if the observation was in the Reporting-w Slack condition and zero if the observation was in the Reporting-w/o Slack condition) as the independent variable. Because the actual cost of the implemented project also affected the lower-level manager's payoff, I included it in the regression as a control variable.
I find that the lower-level manager's payoff was significantly higher (t=6.31, p<.001) by an average of $1.79 when they misreported to implement the less profitable CSR project in the Reporting-w Slack condition than when they misreported to implement the less profitable CSR project in the Reporting-w/o Slack condition. This result is consistent with the ability to consume slack leading to higher payoffs for lower-level managers when they reported to implement the less profitable CSR project in the Reporting-w Slack condition. In turn, it is likely that lowerlevel managers' higher payoffs in the Reporting-w Slack condition increased their willingness to misreport to implement the less profitable CSR project in that condition.
Test of RQ3
RQ3 asks how the percentage of slack varied across three different types of lower-level managers; those whose reports were dominated by preferences for honesty, those whose reports were dominated by preferences for wealth and those whose reports were dominated by preferences for CSR. To examine this question I first divided lower-level managers in the Reporting-w Slack condition into three separate groups based on the three preferences described above. Managers who never misreported to implement a less profitable CSR project and reported to consume less than half of the available slack were classified as "Honest" types.
Managers who never misreported to implement a less profitable CSR project but reported to consume more than half of the available slack were classified as "Wealth" types. Finally, managers who chose to implement a less profitable CSR project more than half of the time were classified as "Strong CSR" types.
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As shown in Table 4 , based on these classifications, 7 of the 36 participants (19.4%) were classified as Honest types, 4 participants (11.1%) were classified as Wealth types, and 10 participants (27.8%) were classified as Strong CSR types. Table 4 As also shown in 18 Because some individuals likely did not have a dominant preference for wealth, CSR or honesty, 15 of the 36 participants in the Reporting-w Slack condition have been classified as "Weak CSR" types since all of these individuals choose to implement a less profitable CSR project at least once, but did not do so more than 50% of the time. To ensure that my results regarding RQ3 and RQ4 were not driven by my definition of CSR types, I repeated all of the reported tests for Strong CSR types including the Weak CSR types. All statistical inferences using both Strong CSR and Weak CSR types were unchanged from the reported inferences using only the Strong CSR types.
( 
Additional Analysis Does implementation of unprofitable CSR vary with cost?
Because I vary the cost of recommending or reporting to implement a less profitable CSR project, I can examine whether preferences for CSR activities are impacted by the cost of such activities. As shown in Table 5 , the frequency of less profitable CSR project implementation decreased in all conditions when the cost of the CSR project increased. A logistic regression in which the dependent variable is whether the less profitable CSR project was implemented (yes or no), and the dichotomous independent variable is the cost of the CSR project, shows a negative and significant (z=-7.12; p<.001) relationship between the cost of the CSR project and the frequency with which it was implemented. However, as shown in Table 5 , a significant portion of managers in all three conditions continued to recommend or report to have the less profitable CSR project implemented even when the cost of the CSR project increased from 10% to 50%
higher than the non-CSR alternative.
19 (Table 5) 
V. Conclusion
Prior research implicitly assumes that upper-level managers decide whether to engage in CSR activities after carefully weighing the associated costs and benefits (Kim et al. 2012; Barnea and Rubin 2010) . Missing from this assumption is how such upper-level decision makers get the cost and benefit information needed to make CSR decisions. Such information often comes from lower-level managers. For this reason, I conduct an experiment to investigate whether, in such a setting, lower-level managers bias their communication to upper-level managers in favor of CSR projects, leading to the implementation of less profitable CSR projects rather than more profitable non-CSR projects.
Two factors often present in a setting in which lower-level managers communicate information to upper-level managers could influence the extent to which such information is biased in favor of CSR activities. First, the communication of information from lower-level managers to upper-level managers often takes the form of a report that requires a factual 19 In addition, if all of the prior tests are repeated using only instances in which the cost of the CSR project was 50% higher than the cost of the non-CSR project, all previously reported statistical inferences for H1 and RQ's 1 and 2 are unchanged. While results for RQ's 3 and 4 followed a similar pattern as the previously reported results, because both of these research questions are tested using only data from the Reporting-w Slack condition, the reduction in sample size makes statistical inferences difficult for these two research questions.
assertion regarding the costs or benefits of alternative courses of action. The need to make a factual assertion introduces a potential role for honesty preferences to influence the extent to which lower-level managers bias their reports. Second, in many reporting settings lower-level managers can build slack into their reports. Because the ability to consume slack affects lowerlevel manager's payoffs, this ability could also influence the extent to which they bias their reports. I find that lower-level managers recommendations cause the less profitable CSR project rather than the more profitable non-CSR project to be implemented 47% of the time. The frequency of less profitable CSR project implementation decreases to 22% when lower-level managers must misreport to implement the less profitable CSR project, suggesting that their honesty preferences act as a significant, but not full, control against the implementation of less profitable CSR projects. However, when lower-level managers are also able to build slack into their reports, the frequency of less profitable CSR projects increases to 36%, suggesting that the ability to consume slack offsets the deterrent effect of honesty preferences against the implementation of less profitable CSR projects.
My results add to our understanding of how CSR decisions are made within firms. Step 1
Step 2 Step 3 Step 4
Panel B -Reporting-w/o Slack Condition
Step 1
Panel C -Reporting-w Slack Condition
Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 The e Mean % of slack taken is measured as (slack taken / slack available). f Participants were asked to rate their response to the question "To what extent was your reporting choice regarding the cost of the two projects influenced by a desire to report honestly?" on a 7 point Likert scale with end points of zero "No Influence" and 6 "Very High Influence" and a midpoint of 3 "Moderate Influence." g Participants were asked to rate their response to the question "To what extent was your reporting choice regarding the cost of the two projects influenced by a desire to implement the green project?" on a 7 point Likert scale with end points of zero "No Influence" and 6 "Very High Influence" and a midpoint of 3 "Moderate Influence." h Participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they agree with the following statement: "When the green project had the higher actual cost, I considered the amount my possible payoff would be reduced in deciding whether to misreport to get the green project implemented" on a 7 point Likert scale with end points of -3 "Strongly Disagree" and 3 "Strongly Agree" and a midpoint of zero "Neither Agree nor Disagree." a When the actual cost of the CRR project was $11, the actual cost of the CSR project was $1 higher than the actual cost of the non-CSR project ($11-10)and 10% higher than the actual cost of the non-CSR project ($1/$10). b When the actual cost of the CRR project was $13, the actual cost of the CSR project was $3 higher than the actual cost of the non-CSR project ($13-10)and 30% higher than the actual cost of the non-CSR project ($3/$10). c When the actual cost of the CRR project was $15, the actual cost of the CSR project was $5 higher than the actual cost of the non-CSR project ($15-10)and 50% higher than the actual cost of the non-CSR project ($5/$10).
